Integrity

QwenWorkVerify the file before you run it

Three commands, one minute. If the signature does not match the vendor, stop — do not try to work around it.

Windows: hash, then signature

Hash first, because it catches a truncated download in one line. Signature second, because it proves who built the file.

certutil -hashfile "qwenworkcn-setup-x64.exe" SHA256
Get-AuthenticodeSignature ".\qwenworkcn-setup-x64.exe" | Format-List Status, SignerCertificate

Status should read Valid. If it reads NotSigned or HashMismatch, delete the file — do not run it with a warning dismissed. Note that the hash changes with every release; compare against the value published for the version you downloaded, not against an old note.

macOS: codesign and notarisation

codesign -dv --verbose=4 /Applications/QwenWork.app
spctl -a -vv /Applications/QwenWork.app
shasum -a 256 ~/Downloads/qwenworkcn-darwin-arm64.dmg

spctl should answer accepted with source=Notarized Developer ID. An accepted with source=Unnotarized Developer ID means the app is signed but has not been through Apple's notary service; that is a yellow flag worth a second look, though it can also happen on very fresh builds.

Linux: sha256sum and package inspection

sha256sum qwenworkcn-linux-amd64.deb
dpkg-deb -I qwenworkcn-linux-amd64.deb | head -20

The vendor does not publish a detached GPG signature for the deb, so sha256sum compared against the value on the download page is the practical check. dpkg-deb -I shows the maintainer string and dependencies; a maintainer that is not the vendor is a reason to stop.

What a valid publisher looks like

The signer should be the operating entity behind the product, matching the name on the official site's footer. A valid but unexpected publisher name means you are holding a repack by someone else, even if everything else looks right. This is the single most common way a tampered installer passes a hash check: the attacker re-signs with their own certificate.

Do not disable the check to make an install work. Turning off Gatekeeper or running with execution policy bypassed converts a warning into an incident. If verification fails, re-download from the CDN on a different network and try again before assuming the file is bad.

When the CDN gives you a different build tomorrow

Because the path uses /release/latest/, the file behind a link changes with each release. Store the version, date and hash together if you keep installers for offline deployment. A hash without a version is not a useful record.

Checking a download that came from somewhere other than this site? Use the same commands — the method does not depend on the source, only on the expected values being trustworthy.